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Abstract
Many developed countries have turned to immigration in order to mitigate the con-
sequences of population aging, particularly the expected decline in the labor force 
population. Yet, few projection models take in consideration explicitly the differ-
entials in labor force participation of population sub-groups. This paper describes 
the labor force participation module of CEPAM-Mic, which is a microsimulation 
model that projects several demographic, ethnocultural, and socioeconomic dimen-
sions of the EU28 member countries population. Then, the microsimulation model 
is used to project EU labor force population for the period 2015–2060 under differ-
ent scenarios illustrating how implementing sex- and country-specific dynamics of 
immigrants’ integration may affect the future labor force in terms of size, rates, and 
gender composition. We estimated the parameters of the labor force module using 
logistic regressions based on the EU-Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). In addition 
to age, sex, and education, immigrant-related variables are also included, such as 
immigrant status, place of birth, age at immigration, and duration of residence in the 
estimation of the probability of being active. Our results demonstrate the importance 
of taking into account differentials in labor force participation of population sub-
groups when asserting the potential of immigration as a tool for managing popula-
tion aging. In the European context, adding immigration differentials in labor force 
participation affects mainly downward the number of female immigrants in the labor 
force, while smaller differences are observed for male immigrants. An increase 
in immigration levels leads obviously to an increase in the total labor force size, 
but may also widen gender inequalities in labor force participation and has limited 
impact on the total labor force participation rate. Our findings suggest that relying 
on immigration as a tool to alleviate economic issues arising from population aging 
must imperatively be accompanied by strong and efficient measures to promote a 
full economic integration of immigrants.
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Introduction
As demographic aging is transforming the working-age population of developed 
nations, understanding and forecasting labor force participation becomes increas-
ingly relevant for policy makers. Indeed, as the boomers move into retirement 
and are replaced by smaller cohorts of young individuals entering the labor force, 
concerns grow about the increasing proportion of inactive people within the adult 
population.
Recent research has shown, however, that the situation may not be as critical as 
previously thought. Indeed, labor force participation differs across cohorts so that 
many countries are now experiencing an increase in participation rates of older 
workers due to delayed retirement (Hasselhorn and Apt 2015; Loichinger and 
Prskawetz 2017). In addition, participation rates for women have increased drasti-
cally in the past decades (Cipollone et al. 2014). Thus, the projection of economic 
indicators such as labor force participation may provide a better assessment of 
the consequences of population aging than strictly demographic measures (Loich-
inger et al. 2017; Sanderson and Scherbov 2015).
Many developed countries have turned to immigration in order to mitigate 
the consequences of population aging (Termote 2011). The expectation is usu-
ally that immigration should increase the share of the working-age population 
and, by extension, would positively affect economic dependency indicators. With 
declining rates of natural increase, immigration is becoming the main driver of 
demographic growth and is significantly remodeling the ethnocultural landscape 
in several countries (Coleman 2006). In this context, it becomes important to give 
special attention to the growing share of first- and second-generation immigrants 
in the working-age population, as their market behavior can differ significantly 
from the market behavior of natives.
This paper examines the effects of taking immigration-related variables into 
account when doing labor force projections in countries of the European Union. 
The first section reviews recent efforts in labor force projection in the European 
context and highlights the relevance of including immigration characteristics 
in labor force projections. The second section briefly presents CEPAM-Mic, a 
microsimulation model that projects several demographic, ethnocultural, and 
socioeconomic dimensions of the EU28 member countries population and looks 
in more details to the labor force participation module of that projection model. 
The last section compares outputs from different projection scenarios to demon-
strate that incomplete economic integration of immigrants affects the results of 
labor force projections in terms of size, rates, and gender composition.
This research is part of the Centre of Expertise on Population and Migra-
tion (CEPAM), a joint research project of the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European 
Commission. The microsimulation projection model presented in this paper is 
used to study the consequences of alternative migration scenarios on future popu-
lation trends in Europe, one of CEPAM’s main research objectives. Such a model 
is very flexible and is characterized by the stochastic simulation of individual life 
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courses based on derived parameters and individual characteristics. Microsimula-
tion is the preferred tool for this analysis as traditional cohort-component projec-
tion models generally cannot be used when a large set of characteristics must be 
projected simultaneously.
The Importance of Including Immigration Differentials in Labor Force 
Participation Projections
The most common way to project the labor force is to apply predetermined partici-
pation rates by age and sex to standard demographic projection outputs. Many meth-
ods have also been developed to build assumptions concerning the future evolution 
of these rates, such as extrapolation models, targets scenarios, and regression mod-
els based on macro-indicators (International Labour Organization 2011).
Major recent attempts to project the size of the labor force in Europe include the 
Aging Report of the European Commission (European Commission and Economic 
Policy Committee 2014), projections by Loichinger (2015), and OECD projections 
(Spielvogel and Meghnagi 2018). The Aging Report used average entry and exit 
rates based on recent trends and applied them to the Eurostat’s age–sex population 
projections for each country. It is based on the 2013 Eurostat population projections 
by age and sex and uses a cohort simulation model to project future participation 
rates. It gives a particular attention to the increase in the labor force participation 
of women, which is mainly driven by a demographic metabolism effect of younger 
generations of women more attached to the labor market replacing older women 
with lower participation rates. It also considers how recent pension reforms imple-
mented in many European countries can affect future participation of older workers, 
but in definitive does not consider changes in other characteristics of the population 
that can have an impact on future labor force participation rates.
Loichinger (2015) specifically addresses what could be the impact on future 
labor force size of European countries of one of these characteristics: the increase 
in educational attainment that is likely to occur (Lutz et  al. 2014). As more edu-
cated population show higher participation rates than less educated, controlling for 
the expected increase in the average education level of the future European popu-
lation should provide a more favorable picture of the expected future. Indeed, her 
projections results comparing scenarios that included or omitted the effect of edu-
cation and suggest that the future size of the labor force might be larger than what 
was previously anticipated. The model used by Loichinger based on the multidimen-
sional population projections developed by Lutz et al. (2014) makes a strong case 
for controlling for expected future changes in the composition of a population when 
projecting the future of the labor market supply. It had the advantage of including 
an important source of heterogeneity, but it is limited by its methodology when it 
comes to add additional sources of heterogeneity.
Multistate projection models can handle one or two additional dimensions with 
age and sex, but they are generally unable to produce more complex results, as they 
can only accommodate a limited number of dimensions. Indeed, as the size of the 
matrix increases exponentially with the number of variables included in the model, 
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these matrices can rapidly become unmanageable as the number of included vari-
ables and modalities increases. Thus, their users have to rely on the assumption that 
homogeneity exists in the behaviors of population groups defined by age, sex, and 
possibly another variable such as education. In the context of labor force participa-
tion of immigrants and natives, empirical evidences, however, suggest that such an 
assumption constitutes an oversimplification.
In a recent OECD report, Spielvogel and Meghani (2018) evaluate the contribu-
tion of migration to future labor dynamics of EU and other OECD countries for 
the period 2015–2030. Like Loichinger, their results show that the labor force is 
less sensitive to aging than the overall population in part because of the predictable 
increase in the labor force participation rates associated to the increasing education 
level of the population and to the reduction of the gender gap in labor force par-
ticipation. They innovate, however, by taking into consideration another source of 
heterogeneity in labor force participation: the immigration status. Labor force par-
ticipation of migrants differs from natives even when controlling for education level. 
They show that in the European context, immigrants from non-European countries 
have lower participation rates (Spielvogel and Meghnagi 2018). In particular, immi-
grant women with low education have very low participation rates.
They project labor force population by age, sex, education, and three immigra-
tion statuses (natives, EU migrants, and non-EU migrants) using a simple stratagem. 
Since there are no possible transitions over the life course between immigration 
statuses, the total labor force population is obtained by adding the results of three 
separate projections by sub-population. This approach has the main advantage of 
allowing the use of different participation rates between natives and immigrants, but 
it also has a number of limitations. First, they do not project fertility and in conse-
quence, they can only project the labor force population over a horizon of 15 years. 
They also assume constant mortality rates over all the projection period and no 
differentials in mortality rates by education or immigration status, another impor-
tant draw back. Also, net migration is estimated as a residual, which means that it 
includes all the measurement errors in their estimate of the migration component of 
their model, a source of error that can be relatively large when net migration is close 
to zero. Finally, they do not account for variations in labor force participation of 
immigrants by duration of stay in the country or by age at immigration.
In most developed countries, immigrants struggle to achieve full economic inte-
gration as they encounter more labor market obstacles than natives (Bevelander 
2005; Büchel and Frick 2005; Kahn 2004; Model and Lin 2002; OECD 2010). 
Moreover, research has shown a deterioration of the economic integration of immi-
grants over the last decades, in particular for non-Whites and immigrants born in 
third-world countries (Dustmann et  al. 2003; Kogan 2006). In general, the labor 
market performance of international immigrants tends to improve with the number 
of years passed in the host country (Alba and Nee 1997; Borjas 2008), but many 
immigrants are now failing to catch up to natives in terms of economic outcomes 
(Aydemir and Skuterud 2005; Beyer 2016; Picot and Sweetman 2011). In some 
immigrant communities, a double disadvantage arises from being an immigrant and 
a woman, resulting in much wider gender inequalities in terms of labor force partici-
pation (Adsera and Chiswick 2007; Boyd 1984; Donato et al. 2014; Dustmann et al. 
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2003). Projections that fail to integrate immigration-related differentials in terms of 
labor market outcomes can thus likely produce biased results, in particular for alter-
native scenarios assessing the impact of different levels of immigration on the future 
size of the labor force.
Second, international immigration to EU28 countries affects human capital 
stocks, which are major determinants of labor force participation rates. In countries 
where immigration flows come mainly from asylum seekers and family reunifica-
tions, immigrants are concentrated in low educated groups. Conversely, in countries 
with a selective labor migration system, immigrants are on average more educated 
than the natives (Eurostat 2017). In consequence, migrants are often overrepresented 
among the low and highly educated (Arslan et al. 2015). In addition, studies con-
ducted in the USA and in Europe have shown that many children of immigrants 
from racial and linguistic minorities are disadvantaged in their educational trajec-
tory (Hirschman 2001; Marois et al. 2017; Riphahn 2003). These differentials need 
to be accounted for when measuring the effect of immigration on future human capi-
tal stocks, and by extension, on future labor force participation.
Finally, immigrants and natives differ in terms of demographic behaviors, and this 
difference may have a significant impact on the composition and the age structure of 
the population. Depending on their country of origin, fertility levels of immigrants 
are often higher than fertility levels of natives, especially in the first years following 
their arrival (Bélanger and Gilbert 2007; Coleman 1994; Mayer and Riphahn 2000; 
Mussino and Strozza 2012; Toulemon 2004). Mortality rates of immigrants are usu-
ally lower at their arrival and then tend to slowly converge to the rates of natives 
(Kennedy et  al. 2006; Ng 2011). Increased fertility and lower mortality early after 
migration are thought to occur in part because of a tempo effect (women delay preg-
nancy after immigration) and because of the self-selection of healthy individuals 
(only the healthiest have the strength to migrate). Different mobility patterns between 
immigrants and natives are also likely to shape the spatial distribution of the popula-
tion as well as to impact hypotheses on international emigration, given the propensity 
of recent immigrants to realize a return migration (Dustmann and Weiss 2007).
The CEPAM Microsimulation Model and Its Labor Force Participation 
Module
Overview of the CEPAM‑Mic Model
CEPAM-Mic is a microsimulation projection model developed for the CEPAM pro-
ject. Its core structure and base population are exhaustively described elsewhere 
(Bélanger and Sabourin 2017; Bélanger et  al. 2018; Marois et  al. 2017; Sabourin 
et  al. 2017). Briefly, the model aims to project the population of all EU28 mem-
ber countries along several demographic, ethnocultural, and socioeconomic dimen-
sions. In addition to age, sex, and education, immigration-related variables are also 
included in the model, such as immigrant status, place of birth, age at immigration, 
and duration of residence in the host country. Individuals from the base population 
are simulated one by one and their characteristics are modified through scheduled 
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events whose timing are stochastically (Monte Carlo) determined using the values 
of their specific input parameters at any given time during the projection period. In 
addition to life-course changes, the model also allows for intergenerational trans-
fers of characteristics from mother to child. The parameters used as inputs are them-
selves derived through various statistical methods, using available data sources. The 
next section provides a detailed description of the labor force participation module.
Description of the Labor Force Participation Module
CEPAM-Mic uses an approach that is similar to the approach used by Statistics 
Canada in DemoSim in modeling labor force participation (Bélanger and Bastien 
2013; Caron-Malenfant et  al. 2017). In short, the labor force participation status 
(Active or Inactive) is derived for the population aged 15 to 74 years old and is reas-
sessed every time that a relevant characteristic of the actor is modified (such as age, 
education, duration of immigration). LFP status is assigned through a Monte Carlo 
experiment where a random number is compared to the probability of being active 
of an actor given his/her set of characteristics. This probability is itself derived from 
parameters estimated from a logistic regression performed. Future evolution of 
labor force participation rates depends also on country-specific entry and exit rates 
by cohort, sex, and education. Global participation rates in the model further vary 
through compositional effects, whereas groups with higher or lower participation 
rates may increase their relative importance in the population.
The European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) is the only data source providing 
comprehensive and standardized questions on labor force participation for all EU28 
countries as well as on education, age, sex, and some immigration-related variables. 
EU-LFS data from 2010 to 2015 were pooled to minimize conjectural factors and to 
provide a large enough sample to derive robust parameters for all countries and both 
sexes. Sex- and country-specific logit regressions were then performed on a bino-
mial variable giving LFP status as defined by the International Labor Organization 
(ILOSTAT).1 Equation 1 provides a mathematical description of the regression model:
where
• β0 + β1 + β2 + β4 capture the joint effect of age and education on labor force par-
ticipation rates.2 Education is divided into three categories:
(1)
logit(P) = 훽0 + 훽1AGE + 훽2EDU + 훽3YEAR + 훽4(AGE × EDU)
+ 훽5(AGE × YEAR) + 훽6(EDU × YEAR) + 훽7(AGE × EDU × YEAR)
+ 훽8IMMIG + 훽9(IM15 × EDU)
1 Individuals in compulsory military service are considered part of the active population.
2 The LFS does not provide information on labor force participation rates in the UK for the age group 
70–74. It was therefore assumed to be half of the value observed for the age group 65–69 for each educa-
tion level.
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1. Low (L): Completed lower secondary education or less (ISCED 0, 1, and 2);
2. Medium (M): Completed upper secondary (ISCED 3);
3. High (H): Postsecondary education (ISCED 97: 4, 5A, 5B, and 6; ISCED 
2011: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8);
• β3 + β5 + β6 + β7 capture the age and education specific trends in labor force par-
ticipation;
• β8 is a set of parameters for an immigration variable (IMMIG) combining place 
of birth,3 age at arrival, and duration of stay. The variable is divided in five cat-
egories:
1. Born in EU28;
2. Generation 1.54 born outside EU28;
3. Generation 15 born outside EU28, duration of stay < 5;
4. Generation 1 born outside EU28, 5 ≤ duration of stay < 10;
5. Generation 1 born outside EU28, 10 ≤ duration of stay;
• β9 is a set of parameters estimating the labor force returns on education for 
migrants born outside the European Union and who arrived at the age of 15 or 
above (IM15).
A model including parameters β0 to β7 would provide gross participation rates by 
age, sex, and education. Implementing β8 and β9 further provides participation rates 
that are net from immigration-related characteristics.
It should be noted that immigration variables do not distinguish natives from 
intra-European migrants. A person born in Germany and living in France, for 
instance, would have the same parameters as a French native. This assumption, 
although not ideal, aims at minimizing inconsistencies arising from the fact that 
intra-European mobility in the projection model does not account for LFP status.
Analysis of Regression Results
Figure 1 shows the average derived probability of being active obtained from the 
parameters β0 + β1 + β2 + β4 for all EU28 countries, by age, sex, and education for 
EU-born individuals (the reference category for the variable IMMIG) in 2015 (the 
reference category of the variable YEAR).
Expectedly, Fig. 1 shows that people with higher education levels are much more 
likely to be active than people with the lowest level of education. This holds true 
for most age groups and for both sexes, but the education differential is stronger 
for women. After the age of 60, the gap in the probability of being active between 
3 For Germany, the question on the country of birth is not asked in the LFS. We use the nationality as a 
proxy to distinguish EU28 migrants from international immigrants.
4 Generation 1.5: immigrants admitted before the age of 15.
5 Generation 1: immigrants admitted at the age of 15 and above.
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education levels increases: people with high education are more likely to be active 
than others, and they are active for a longer time. The education gradient is also 
steeper for women: for middle age adults, the difference in the probability of being 
active between low and high education is in general less than 15 percentage points 
for men, while it sometimes exceeds 25 percentage points for women. Similar dif-
ferences by education level were also found by Loichinger (2015) and by Spielvogel 
and Meghnagi (2018). Overall, these results stress the importance of integrating the 
education dimension in projections of labor force participation, especially for coun-
tries experiencing population aging and variations across cohorts in terms of human 
capital.
Table 1 shows the average value of β8 (the parameter for the immigration varia-
ble, see Eq. 1) for all EU countries, while Fig. 2 shows the sex- and country-specific 
values of this parameter. Note that thanks to the relatively large sample size, almost 
all sex- and country-specific parameters are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
Turning to Table 1, we see that the results go in the expected direction. For men, 
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Fig. 1  Probability of being active (Converted from the average of country-specific parameters) for EU-
born individuals by age, sex, and highest level of educational attainment, EU28, 2015. Source: Pooled 
data of LFS 2010–2015, authors’ calculation
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labor force participation for immigrants born outside the EU is much lower than 
for EU-born individuals (β8 = − 0.936 for recent immigrants), although it improves 
with the number of years spent in the host country. After 10 years, the labor force 
participation rates of immigrants are close to the rates of EU-born individuals 
(β8 = − 0.223), and this holds true in many high-immigration countries (β8 = 0.063 
for Spain, − 0.185 for France, − 0.040 for Italy and − 0.256 for UK; see Fig.  2). 
Table 1  Average value of β8 (IMMIG, see Eq. 1), EU28, 2010–2015
Women Men
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Born in EU28 Ref Ref Ref Ref
Generation 1.5 born outside EU28 − 0.220 0.322 − 0.180 0.265
Generation 1 born outside EU28, duration of stay < 5 − 1.642 0.566 − 0.936 0.850
Generation 1 born outside EU28, 5 ≤ duration of stay < 10 − 1.258 0.433 − 0.520 0.732
Generation 1 born outside EU28, 10 ≤ duration of stay − 0.755 0.371 − 0.223 0.691
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Fig. 2  Value of β8 (IMMIG, ref = Born in EU28; see Eq. 1), by sex and country of residence, 2010–2015
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However, an important gap remains for immigrants established for a decade or more 
in some countries, such as Germany (β8 = − 0.752), Belgium (β8 = − 0.917), and the 
Netherland (β8 = − 1.183). In Denmark, where immigration inflows are dominated by 
refugees and family reunification (Liebig 2007), the situation even appears to dete-
riorate with time. Indeed, β8 drops from − 1.078 for recent immigrants to − 1.692 for 
immigrants admitted more than 10 years ago. Conversely, among males, labor force 
participation rates in Greece and in Luxemburg are higher for immigrants than for 
natives and are higher for more recent immigrants than for established immigrants. 
Spain emerges as a special case; no clear differences appear between male immi-
grants and natives. In any case, it should be kept in mind that only formal immigra-
tion is considered, as illegal immigrants are not explicitly surveyed in the EU-LFS.
Participation rates of immigrant women follow similar patterns as for immigrant 
men, although the gap compared to natives is wider. For recent immigrants born 
outside the European Union, the average value of β8 for women is more than fifty 
percent lower than it is for men (β8 = − 1.642, see Table 1). Even after 10 years, their 
participation rates are far below the rates of natives (β8 = − 0.755). In fact, labor 
force participation rates of immigrant women do not reach the level of natives in any 
of the high-immigration countries. Gender inequity in terms of labor force participa-
tion appears to be an issue affecting immigrant women more strongly than natives, 
which supports the double disadvantage theory (Ballarino and Panichella 2017; 
Boyd 1984). These results are also consistent with evidences gathered in the U.S.by 
Antecol (2000) and in Europe by Pessin and Arpino (2018) concerning the role of 
cultural background in labor force integration: for some source regions, persistent 
gender gaps resist explanation based on socioeconomic or institutional factors alone.
Immigrants who established themselves before the age of 15 (generation 1.5) 
have participation rates that are closer to natives for both sexes, although still a bit 
lower (β8 = − 0.220 for women and β8 = − 0.180 for men, see Table 1). This shows 
some evidence of integration, as their labor force participation rates are much closer 
to the rates of natives than to the rates of immigrants arrived at an older age. In some 
countries, however, immigrants from generation 1.5 encounter larger difficulties in 
the labor force, such as in the Netherland (β8 = − 0.469 for women and β8 = − 0.496 
for men), in the UK (β8 = − 0.506 for women and β8 = − 0.434 for men), and in Bel-
gium (β8 = − 0.568 for women and β8 = − 0.466 for men). Interestingly, no notable 
gender gaps remain for generation 1.5 immigrants.
Table 2 shows the average values of parameters for education alone (β2) and for 
the interaction of education with a dichotomous variable for generation 1 migrants 
born outside the EU (β9). Unsurprisingly, as was already highlighted in Fig.  1, 
Table 2  Average value of parameters for education and its interaction with immigration
Level Women Men
EDU (β2) EDU × IM15 (β9) EDU (β2) EDU × IM15 (β9)
Low − 1.753 0.817 − 2.005 0.590
Medium − 0.753 0.467 − 0.751 0.153
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education is a major driver of labor force participation and has similar effects for 
both males and females (see Table 2). However, the effect of education is smaller for 
immigrants, especially for women. The positive effect on participation rate of having 
a high education level is about 50% lower for immigrant women when compared to 
native women. The impact of education on labor force participation is also reduced 
for male immigrants but less (by about a quarter, see Table 2). These lower returns 
on education could be partly explained by lower quality degrees in source countries, 
as well as by cultural differences in the definition of gender roles (Antecol 2000; 
Inglehart and Norris 2003). Note that although this pattern is observed in most 
countries, some exceptions still remain. The most notable one is the case of females 
in the UK, where the parameter for β9 is not statistically significant, suggesting that 
in this country, the return on education for natives and immigrants is similar, at least 
in terms of labor force participation.
Future Labor Force Participation Scenarios6
Equation 1 presented above provides estimates for the 2010–2015 period. For pro-
jection purposes, explicit assumptions on future trends in labor force participation 
are necessary. Assuming constant rates would mean stopping abruptly the current 
trend in increasing labor force participation of women and of older workers. Cohort 
developments can be used to project participation rates by calculating entry and exit 
rates (Carone 2005; Loichinger 2015; Productivity Commission 2005). Increases in 
participation rates between time t-5 and t between age group (x,x + 4) and (x + 5, 
x + 9) mean that cohort participation increases, and entry rates are calculated by 
dividing positive change in the participation rate by the population at risk, being 
those of the same cohort that were not working at time t-5:
where j
i
PRx,x+4 is the education- (j) and sex-specific (i) participation rate of age 
groups7 x to x + 4. Similarly, decreases in participation between time t-5 and t 
between age group (x,x + 4) and (x + 5,x + 9) signify that cohort participation 
decreased, and exit rates are calculated by dividing the change in the participation 
rate by those that were working at time t-5:
(2)jiEntryrate
t
x,x+4
=
j
i
PRt
x+5,x+9
−
j
i
PRt−5
x,x+4
1 −
j
i
PRt−5
x,x+4
(3)jiExitrate
t
x,x+4
=
j
i
PRt−5
x,x+4
−
j
i
PRt
x+5,x+9
j
i
PRt−5
x,x+4
6 The authors would like to acknowledge Elke Loichinger for her help in the estimation method of future 
labor force participation.
7 The participation rate for the age group 15–19 has no differential for education.
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Entry and exit rates by age, sex, and education level are calculated for each 
country, based on participation rates of the years 2010 and 2015 (calculated with 
β0 to β7 from Eq. 1). In order to obtain future participation rate, we used these 
entry and exit rates to build a labor force participation table for a synthetic cohort 
with the following equations, using Eq. 4 when the entry rate is positive and Eq. 5 
when the exit rate is negative.
Entry and exit rates are kept constant between 2020 and 2060, and the partici-
pation rate of 2015 is used for the age group 15–19. Participation rates that would 
be projected to decrease after 2015 are kept at their 2015 values to avoid unrealis-
tically low rates in the future.
In order to assess the effect of immigration on the projected labor force, four 
scenarios are built.
1 EDU
   In this scenario, only labor force participation by age, sex, and education levels 
are taken into account. A logit regression including β0 to β7 is first performed and 
the cohort development method is then applied in order to determine future labor 
force participation rates. Hence, the projection will not account for immigration-
related variables in determining the future labor force.
2 EDU_IMM
   In this scenario, immigration-related parameters are added to the model (cor-
responding to parameters β8 and β9). Entry and exit rates calculated from β0 to 
β7 are adjusted in consequence to get future rates by age, sex, and education, net 
from immigration variables. In other words, we used the complete regression 
model presented in Eq. 1 and we used the cohort development method to evolve 
the cohort-education labor force participation rates.
3 EDU+
   This scenario uses the same parameters as the EDU scenario for the labor 
force participation, but the inflow of international immigrants (born outside the 
European Union) is doubled.
4 EDU_IMM+
   This scenario uses the same parameters as the EDU_IMM scenario for the 
labor force participation, but the inflow of international immigrants (born outside 
the European Union) is doubled. It is assumed that an increase in immigration 
will not affect labor force participation, a hypothesis consistent with the scientific 
consensus on the marginal economic impact of immigration (Longhi et al. 2008).
Comparison of the EDU and EDU_IMM scenarios will show the impact of immi-
gration-related differentials in labor force participation in scenario situation where 
(4)jiPR
t+5
x+5,x+9
=
j
i
Entryratet
x,x+4
×
(
PRmax −
j
i
PRt
x,x+4
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+
j
i
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j
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)
×
j
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the size and composition of future cohorts of immigrants remain stable. Comparison 
of the EDU+ and EDU_IMM+ scenarios will further show the extent to which pro-
jected labor force participation is sensitive to immigration levels, as immigration-
related differentials are taken into account.
The main objective of this paper is to propose a new method in projecting the 
impact of immigration-related variables on labor force participation. Accordingly, 
projection assumptions for other components are the same in all four scenarios. The 
base population is itself built from the 2014 to 2015 EU-LFS, all rounds of the ESS 
and Eurostat census data, and includes immigration-related variables such as place 
of birth (Sabourin et al. 2017). Fertility rates are estimated from logit regressions 
taking into account, age, education, region of birth, age at immigration, duration of 
stay, and country of residence and calibrated on future trends estimated in Lutz et al. 
(2018). Mortality rates by age, sex, and educational attainment are taken from Lutz 
et  al. (2018). Assumptions on future educational attainment also take social capi-
tal and ethnocultural characteristics into account (see Marois et al. (2017) for more 
details).
To get out-migration rates by sex and country of residence, the average number 
of out-migrants from 2014 to 2016 (Eurostat table: migr_emi2) was divided by the 
average population aged 20–34 during the same period. Age-specific out-migra-
tion rates are then derived within the microsimulation model as follows. First, the 
Eurostat-derived out-migration rates are applied to the 20–34 population to get the 
expected number of out-migrants on a given year. The number of out-migrants is 
then distributed according to age using a Rogers–Castro schedule. Finally, age-spe-
cific out-migration rates are obtained by taking the ratio of out-migrants to the popu-
lation, by age, sex, and country of residence. Out-migration rates in the simulation 
are recalculated every 5 years. During the simulation, out-migrants may either move 
within the EU, and are assigned a new country of residence, or they can leave the 
EU, in which case their simulation is terminated. The proportion of out-migrants 
leaving the EU are derived from Eurostat tables on emigration according to region 
of destination (table: migr_emi3nxt). Origin–destination matrix for intra-European 
mobility were derived using an update for the period 2009–2016 of Raymer et al.’s 
(2013) Bayesian estimates of European migration.8
In scenarios EDU and EDU_IMM, the number of international immigrants is 
assumed to remain constant to average observed during the period 2013–2016 
(Eurostat 2018).9 Scenarios EDU+ and EDU_IMM+ double this number. Fur-
thermore, future cohorts of immigrants have the same characteristics in terms of 
age, sex education, region of birth, etc. as recent immigrants, which have been 
estimated from the EU-LFS, the EU-ESS, and Eurostat census data. Table 3 pre-
sents the number of immigrants assumed in the high and constant immigration 
scenarios of these projections. These schematic scenarios remain plausible even 
8 The authors would like to acknowledge Erofili Grapsa for the update of Bayesian estimates of migra-
tion flows.
9 In order to remove from the average the abnormal high immigration inflows resulting from the refugee 
crisis, we excluded flows of 2015 for Austria and Germany, and the flow of 2016 for Greece.
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if EDU+ and EDU_IMM+ doubled the number of immigrants from non-EU 
countries, since even the high-immigration scenarios assume lower immigration 
rates than what has been observed for several decades in some other developed 
countries such as Canada and Australia.
Results
Figure 3 illustrates the projected European labor force for the period 2015–2060 and 
Fig. 4 shows labor force dependency ratios (LFDR) for the population aged 15 and 
over for the same period. The LFDR corresponds to the population aged 15 and over 
Table 3  Assumptions on 
the number of international 
immigrants (born outside EU28) 
(5-year inflow)
Host country Scenarios EDU and 
EDU_IMM
Scenarios 
EDU+ and EDU_
IMM+
AT 223,597 447,193
BE 263,245 526,490
BG 84,909 169,818
CY 31,609 63,218
CZ 96,489 192,978
DE 1,991,155 3,982,310
DK 188,434 376,868
EE 16,409 32,818
ES 1,100,676 2,201,353
FI 85,108 170,215
FR 1,101,813 2,203,625
GR 99,462 198,923
HR 37,968 75,935
HU 114,329 228,658
IE 174,873 349,745
IT 1,057,411 2,114,823
LT 37,193 74,385
LU 9,348 18,695
LV 20,310 40,620
MT 34,791 69,583
NL 397,853 795,705
PL 466,226 932,453
PT 55,871 111,743
RO 147,265 294,530
SE 469,441 938,883
SI 51,148 102,295
SK 6,348 12,695
UK 1,630,214 3,260,428
EU28 9,993,490 19,986,979
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out of the labor force divided by the population in the labor force. A ratio of 1 indi-
cates that there is one inactive for each active person in the adult population.
At the EU level, results for EDU (excluding the effect of immigration varia-
bles) and EDU_IMM (including the effect of immigration variables) turn out to be 
approximately the same, with labor force size and participation rates only slightly 
higher in the EDU scenario. In both scenarios, the size of the labor force decreases. 
The decline is of about 23.5 million individuals in the scenario EDU (from 244.8 
million in 2015 to 221.3 million in 2060) and of 26.3 million for EDU_IMM (218.5 
million in 2060). The labor force size in the EDU scenario is larger than in EDU_
IMM by 2.8 million, but this represents only 1.3% of the total. The mean percent 
difference between the projected labor force size of the two scenarios in 2060 for the 
28 countries is 1.2%, although it is a bit higher for high-immigration countries such 
as Germany (3.1%). Similar trends are also observed in the projected labor force 
dependency ratios of the two scenarios. Initially at 0.75 in 2015, the LFDR would 
go up to 1.00 under the EDU scenario and to 1.02 under the EDU_IMM scenario 
in 2060. These results support the hypothesis that labor force projections that are 
omitting immigration variables would slightly overestimate the total labor force size 
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Fig. 3  Projected labor force size according to four scenarios, EU28, 2015–2060
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Fig. 4  Labor force dependency ratio according to four scenarios, EU28, 2015–2060
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and LFDR. The impact can be considered marginal overall, although it can be more 
important for high-immigration countries.
Given differences in labor force participation by immigrant status, the modest 
impact of immigration-related variables on the projection results may appear sur-
prising at first, and several factors can explain it. First, in the reference scenario 
immigration levels are relatively low. In the EU as a whole, as mentioned before, 
international immigration levels are well below what they are in other immigration 
countries. Second, the negative impact of being an immigrant is strongest during the 
first decade after arrival in the host country, and the pool of recent immigrants does 
not grow significantly during the projection. Finally, results at the EU level mask 
important variations across member states: international immigration is mostly con-
centrated in a handful of countries.
When assuming higher immigration levels, the impact of immigration-related 
parameters becomes more apparent. Although both high-immigration scenarios 
reverse the decline of the active population, EDU_IMM+ generates about 6.4 mil-
lion fewer active individuals than EDU+ at the horizon of the projection, a differ-
ence of about 2.3% (Fig.  3). In high-immigration countries such as Germany, or 
in countries where the economic integration of immigrants is problematic, such as 
in Denmark, the difference between the two scenarios can be more important with 
5.2% differences in Germany and 7.8% in Denmark.
Increasing immigration levels has a direct impact on the size of the labor force, 
Fig.  3 shows that doubling international immigration could prevent a labor force 
decline. Increasing immigration levels, however, has a much smaller effect on labor 
force dependency ratios, an indicator more related to the age structure of the popu-
lation. Indeed, compared to EDU, EDU+ improves the LFDR projected for 2060, 
but increasing migration does not reverse the strong expected increase in the LFDR. 
This is in line with demographic literature showing that immigration can only have 
a marginal and temporary effect on the age structure of the host region, and, as a 
consequence, can only have a small impact on participation rates (Bijak et al. 2008; 
Coleman 1992, 2008; Marois 2008).
In addition, the gain in the LFDR arising from doubling immigration levels is 
reduced when introducing immigration-related parameters in the projection. While 
the difference between EDU to EDU+ is of 0.10 point in 2060, this difference drops 
to 0.08 point when comparing EDU_IMM to EDU_IMM+ . Increasing immigration 
levels increases the size of the active population, but it also increases the inactive 
population at a similar pace because labor force participation rates of immigrants are 
lower, especially for women.
For the EU28 as a whole, about 18% of the reduction in the LFDR from doubling 
immigration is canceled by factoring in immigration parameters in the projection 
model. However, this impact varies rather strongly across countries (Fig.  5). The 
impact of doubling international immigration is significantly reduced in most West-
ern European countries. This percentage exceeds 30% in France (32%), Germany 
(37%), Belgium (42%), Denmark (52%), and Netherland (53%) revealing that in 
these countries, the younger age structure of new immigrants barely compensates for 
much lower labor force participation rates. In contrast, when differentials between 
immigrants and natives in labor force activity are factored in, projected labor force 
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dependency ratios improve in Spain (− 5%), Italy (− 8%) and Greece (− 10%), 
because in these countries international migrants show higher labor force participa-
tion rates than natives.
Figure 6 further disaggregates the projections of labor force participation rate by 
immigrant status (either born inside or outside the European Union) for the two high-
immigration scenarios (EDU+ and EDU_IMM+).10 Omitting immigration-related 
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Fig. 5  Proportion of the reduction in LFDR from doubling immigration canceled by implementing immi-
gration differentials in labor force participation, 2060
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Fig. 6  Projected labor force participation rates (age 15 +) for immigrants and natives, EU28, 2015–2060
10 The reference scenario would give similar results.
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differentials (EDU+, blue lines), immigrant participation rate exceeds the cor-
responding rate for natives by 12 to 19 percentage points. Both immigrants and 
natives see a decline in participation rates due to aging and to the retirement of older 
cohorts. The higher participation rate of immigrants is mainly the result of a younger 
age structure associated with the sustained and substantial inflows of new cohorts 
of young migrants. This advantage could even be higher if the educational attain-
ment of migrants was not inferior to the educational attainment of natives. However, 
when differentials in participation rates of immigrants and natives are not taken into 
account, the advantage provided by this younger age structure is reduced by about 
30%. From around 12 to 19 percentage points in EDU+ (compare blue lines), the 
advantage of immigrants decreases to 5 to 13 points in EDU_IMM+ (compare red 
lines). In other words, a projection that does not take into account for immigrant 
lower labor force participation would overestimate the labor force participation rate 
of immigrants by 5 to 8 percent points (compare dashed lines).
As we saw earlier for the immigration parameter (β8, see Eq.  1), differences 
between immigrants and natives are more important for females than they are for 
males. Thus, adding immigration differentials to the projection model does not only 
affect the size of the labor force, but also its composition in terms of immigration 
status and sex.
We assess the impact of adding the immigration parameters on the sex composi-
tion of the immigrant labor force by computing the ratio of the active population 
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Fig. 7  Ratio of the projected number of active immigrants between scenario EDU+ and scenario EDU_
IMM+ in 2060, by sex and country
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projected under the scenarios EDU+ and EDU_IMM+ . This is illustrated in 
Fig. 7, for both sexes and all countries.11 For the EU as a whole, the EDU +/EDU_
IMM+ ratio for male immigrants is equal to 1.03, meaning that the projected num-
ber is overestimated by only 3% when immigration differentials in labor force par-
ticipation are not accounted for. The ratios for male immigrants are close to one in 
most Western Europe countries, with the exception of Denmark (1.19) and the Neth-
erland (1.15) where differences in labor force participation are the largest.
For females for the EU as a whole, the ratio reaches 1.15, meaning that a projec-
tion that does not account for differentials in labor force participation would over-
estimate the number of active female immigrants by about 15%. In absolute size, 
this represents an overestimation of about 6.3 million individuals for EDU+ and 3.3 
million individuals for EDU. The impact of immigration differentials on the num-
ber of active female immigrants is observable in most countries, and is particularly 
strong in Netherland (1.32), Belgium (1.31), Germany (1.30), and Denmark (1.26). 
In Western Europe, only Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal do not follow this trend.
In order to estimate the global impact of immigration parameters on the pro-
jected labor force, Mincer–Zarnowitz regressions are performed on the 2060 active 
population, broken down by age (15–74), sex, and country (Mincer and Zarnowitz 
1969). This procedure can be used to compare two sets of data describing the same 
variable, such as observed and projected values of population counts. In this case, 
EDU_IMM and EDU (or EDU_IMM+ and EDU +) are compared, such that:
A parameter β that is statistically different from 1 thus indicates a systematic rela-
tive difference between the two scenarios, affecting all countries and all age groups. 
Table 4 shows the parameter β for different sub-populations. Note that a value of α 
different from zero would indicate a systematic difference in absolute value between 
the two scenarios, which would be unexpected (different rates are not expected to 
yield absolute biases). Indeed, α is not statistically different from zero in any of our 
comparisons.
(6)��EDU��
(
or ��EDU+��
)
= 훼 + 훽 ×�� EDU_IMM��
(
or ��EDU_IMM+��
)
.
Table 4  Value of β parameters 
from Mincer–Zarnowitz 
regressions
Test if β is different from 1
***p < 0.0001
EDU = β × EDU_IMM EDU += β × EDU_
IMM+
Total 1.014*** 1.026***
 Females 1.024*** 1.046***
 Males 1.003*** 1.006***
Immigrants 1.071*** 1.072***
 Females 1.135*** 1.138***
 Males 1.014*** 1.014***
11 Again, results for EDU_IMM/EDU are similar to EDU_IMM+/EDU+ and are not presented.
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When comparing EDU to EDU_IMM, the value of β for the total active popula-
tion (1.014) indicates a relatively strong concordance between the two scenarios (a 
difference of only about 1.4%). Looking at sub-groups, however, reveals more sub-
stantial discrepancies. At 1.071, the parameter for the immigrant active population 
is much larger than one, indicating an average overestimate of 7.1% for EDU com-
pared to EDU_IMM. This systematic overestimation of the immigrant active popu-
lation is mostly due to female immigrants, for which the active population in EDU 
exceeds EDU_IMM by 13.5% (β = 1.135). The parameters for male immigrants are 
also statistically significant, but much lower. These patterns hold in the high-immi-
gration scenarios (EDU_IMM+ and EDU +).
The above analysis has shown that adding immigration differentials in labor force 
population projections has a significant negative impact on the number of active 
female immigrants, while having a modest effect for active male immigrants. This 
shows that projections yielding similar results at the global level (such as EDU and 
EDU_IMM, for instance) may still generate significant differences in terms of labor 
force composition. The analysis of the active population by gender and immigrant 
status, for instance, could provide relevant insights for the study of intersectional 
inequalities. In that respect, the case of Greece is particularly informative, as includ-
ing immigration differentials in the projection has a strong positive impact on the 
active population of male immigrants, while also having a strong negative impact on 
the number of active female immigrants.
Discussion and Conclusion
Issues related to population aging are a matter of population structure rather than 
population size, as a larger share of the elderly leads to increased public expendi-
tures, especially in terms of health care and pension, and to a proportional decrease 
in potential workers contributing to the system (United Nations 2015). The labor 
force participation rate is therefore one of the key indicators for issues related to 
population aging (European Commission 2015).
In this paper, we analyzed the effect of age, sex, education, generation status, and 
duration of stay in the host country on labor force participation of the European 
Union population using regression analysis. The results from this regression analysis 
were then used as inputs to the labor force participation module of CEPAM-Mic, 
a microsimulation projection model for all EU28 member states. As microsimula-
tion simulates individual life courses, labor force status in the model is stochasti-
cally attributed based on the actor’s characteristics and corresponding regression 
parameters.
By including immigration-related differentials, CEPAM-Mic significantly 
improves on traditional macro models based on age, sex, and education alone. First, 
CEPAM-Mic can account for different levels of immigrant integration to the labor 
force. Indeed, patterns of economic integration vary by sex and between EU28 
member states, as previously shown in Kogan (2006) and confirmed in our regres-
sion analysis. Second, the model explicitly accounts for different effects of education 
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for natives and immigrants through an interaction variable between educational 
attainment and immigration status (generation 1 born outside de EU). This takes 
into account the fact that degrees obtained outside the EU might have a lower value 
on the labor market. Finally, the model accounts for the impact of immigration on 
educational attainment, as education is imputed based on immigrant status, educa-
tion of the mother, religion, and language. This is important as education is a major 
determinant of labor force participation.
Overall, immigration is an important source of population heterogeneity when it 
comes to the projection of labor force participation. Participation rates are lower for 
immigrants, especially for recent immigrants and for immigrant women, but tend to 
improve with increasing duration of stay in the host country. The impact of immi-
gration-related characteristics on labor force participation is often comparable to the 
impact of education, sometimes even surpassing it. The implementation of immi-
gration-related variables and parameters in a microsimulation model also provides 
more flexibility in building alternative migration and integration scenarios that may 
prove relevant and useful to European policy makers.
Analysis of projection outputs confirms that increasing international immigration 
level can hardly mitigate the expected decline of the general labor force participa-
tion rate caused by population aging (Bijak et al. 2008). Although the age structure 
of immigrants is favorable in the short term, benefits to the labor force are offset by 
their lower participation rates, especially for women. In line with the analysis pro-
vided by Termote (2011), our findings suggest that any policy seeking to use immi-
gration as a tool to fix economic issues arising from population aging must impera-
tively be accompanied by strong and efficient measures to promote the economic 
integration of immigrants. When labor force participation rates of immigrants get 
too low, the effect of increasing immigration can even become negative.
Our results also point to potentially rising gender inequalities in labor force par-
ticipation. In most EU countries, the gender gap in labor force participation is larger 
in the immigrant population, even after controlling for education. This provides 
additional empirical evidences for what Boyd (1984) calls the “double disadvan-
tage,” that of being a woman as well as an immigrant. This double disadvantage 
leads to an increase in gender imbalance for the projected labor force, even when 
the impact of immigration on the total labor force is modest. So increasing immigra-
tion levels, while obviously increasing the labor force size, may also widen gender 
inequalities, a trend that goes against the goals set by the European Commission in 
terms of gender equality (European Commission 2017). Further investigations are 
needed on this issue, especially considering that the composition of immigration in 
terms of origin varies greatly from country to country, and that the economic inte-
gration of immigrants also varies according to their origin (Gorodzeisky and Semy-
onov 2017). Policies related to the economic integration of immigrants should there-
fore put a special focus on the labor force participation of female immigrants.
This paper has focused on a single aspect of the economic integration of immi-
grants, namely on labor force participation. The issues related to population aging 
and to the economic integration of immigrants, however, are numerous and are cov-
ered by a wide array of indicators. Employment rates and earnings, for instance, are 
major factors in determining the economic and fiscal impact of immigration, and 
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also intersect with many other issues such as discrimination, over-qualification, and 
international transferability of human capital (Aydemir and Skuterud 2005; Rey-
neri and Fullin 2011). Further developments of the CEPAM-Mic model will seek 
to include additional economic variables, such as employment status and number 
of hours worked per week, which would allow for a better assessment of the overall 
impact of immigration levels and composition on future labor force supply.
Finally, we would like to underline the fact that the EU-LFS lacks a certain 
number of variables that could prove very useful in the assessment of immigrant 
economic integration. It is not possible in the EU-LFS, for instance, to distinguish 
natives from second-generation immigrants, a fast growing group, thus preventing a 
thorough analysis of integration across generations. Other important information on 
human capital, beyond educational attainment, are also missing, such as language 
proficiency and literacy, place of graduation, and reasons for immigration.
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